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IN PURSUIT OF FINANCIAL JUSTICE: 
LOCAL AFRICAN COMMUNITIES’ QUEST 
FOR LEGAL REDRESS AGAINST BUSINESS-
RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Laila Abdul Latif
Abstract: Mining corporations in Africa stand accused of violating 
human rights. This article gives a voice to the plight suffered by local 
African communities in accessing justice to remedy the violation of 
their human rights as a result of the business activities of mining 
corporations. It focuses specifically on the right to access justice in 
order to ask whether the affected communities get a fair and effective 
share of financial remedies to mitigate against the violation of their 
rights to health, clean environment and property. It examines two 
separate and independent avenues through which local communities 
access justice and asks which of the two, judicial or non-judicial 
approaches, guarantee these local communities a right to be heard 
and a recourse to financial remedies. 
Keywords: local communities, mining corporations, human rights 
violations, access to justice, financial remedies 
Introduction
The African continent is rich in resources. Its extractives sector is the 
subject of much policy, law and academic engagement. Policymakers, 
legislative drafters, the private sector and scholars have extensively 
engaged in analysing the potential of the mining, oil, gas and natural 
resource sectors. On the one hand, deliberations are centred on 
the revenue generating ability of the extractives sector (IMF 2011; 
Sigam and Garcia 2012; Shafaie 2015). On the other, there are the tax 
abuses and business-related human rights violations committed by 
corporations exploring, extracting and processing the raw materials 
and minerals (OECD 2015; Ndikumana 2016). This article aims to only 
focus on the relevant academic discourse. It does not seek to contribute 
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towards the discourse on the financial gains or tax evasion practices 
rampant within the extractives sector, but to narrow its scope to 
Africa’s forgotten and most valuable resource – the local communities. 
In doing so, the article utilises the descriptive and explanatory methods 
of inquiry into reviewing and analysing judicial and non-judicial cases 
through which these local communities have tried to seek financial 
compensation against the violation of their human rights. In addition, 
the article seeks to establish the different avenues of dispute resolution 
that local communities can access, also assessing their effectiveness. 
Its theoretical framework is guided by human rights that emphasise 
a government’s and third parties’ duty to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights (Craven 1995; Sepulveda 2003). Within this framework, 
the right to property and the right to have access to justice and remedy 
provide the pillars upon which the article conducts its inquiry. Thus, 
the next section begins by setting out the theoretical approach of 
this article and points out the limited academic engagement with 
the question of access to justice for business-related human rights 
violations. The article then moves on to provide a description of the 
human rights violated by mining companies. Next, it examines several 
African countries discussing whether these avenues facilitate access 
to justice and financial remedies. The article then concludes by giving 
recommendations for improving non-judicial approaches to solving 
community grievances. 
Theory and Literature Informing the Rationale to Address 
Business- Related Human Rights Violations 
Theoretical Approach and Literature Review
Access to justice is a right that is recognised under Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Articles 2, 
14 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). These two core instruments regulating access to justice state 
that everyone has the right to an effective remedy against violations of 
fundamental rights. Relatedly, the UDHR under Article 17 recognises 
the right to own property. Regrettably, however, neither the ICCPR 
nor the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) contain a direct counterpart to Article 17 of the 
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UDHR. Without this subsequent protection of the right to property 
under the international human rights framework, local communities, 
in particular in Africa, have been left vulnerable to exploitation. The 
mining sector has reinforced the vulnerability of the local communities 
by locking them out and impeding their access to justice and seeking 
remedies against the corporation’s business-related human rights 
violations. 
Human rights are given effect through the law. Remedies are made 
available, or should be made available, through national law. In the 
context of African countries, the right to access to justice and the right 
to property are constitutionally protected. Yet, the justifiability of 
these two rights in the context of the mining sector and its business-
related human rights violations against local communities has not 
been sufficiently addressed. On the one hand, there is the damage 
caused to the land and environment as a result of mining which 
directly or indirectly interferes with the local community’s ownership 
of such land and its right to a clean and healthy environment. On the 
other hand, there are difficulties in accessing justice as an avenue to 
address such violations. Scholarship in addressing these twin issues 
has been scarce. Instead, the academic literature has focused on the 
indirect impact of mining activities that have resulted in the poor 
health and well-being of local communities (Hresc et al. 2018); failure 
to redistribute mining company’s revenue generation to benefit local 
communities (Rawashdeh et al. 2016); improving local communities 
engagement in developing sustainable mining activities (Que et al. 
2018); and corruption within the mining sector that results in the 
exploitation of local communities (As’ad 2017). The discourse on 
access to justice by local communities whose human rights have 
been violated, specifically their property rights, and the interrelated 
right to health and a clean and healthy environment, have not been 
examined through a qualitative analysis of data sourced out of judicial 
and non-judicial entities. 
The commitment of States to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights 
of local communities that are affected by activities within the mining 
sector needs to be conceptually addressed. Research on human rights 
violations takes a variety of forms. This usually manifests itself in law 
and court judgements that focus on examining interference with the 
enjoyment of rights and protecting them (Smith 2018). Such court 
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cases have not been examined from the perspective of assessing 
whether local communities are able to effectively access justice in the 
first place before seeking to vindicate the violation of their human 
rights. This then leads to the following questions: What does access 
to justice in the context of local communities against business-related 
human rights violations actually mean? Is access to justice only made 
available through the judicial process? Or do non-judicial avenues 
also provide and promote the right to access justice? Before these 
questions can be answered a description of business-related human 
rights violations of local communities is necessary to justify the need 
to access justice. 
Description of the Human Rights Violated by Mining 
Companies
The argument put forward here is that the nature of politics and 
foreign direct investment is such that in promoting a liberal capitalistic 
market, certain abuses go unchecked and are even overlooked by 
the State under obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. 
Such has been the case in particular with mining companies whose 
activities resulted in the social displacement of local communities. 
These communities have had their homes destroyed, their land and 
means of livelihood lost, culminating in gross violations of human 
rights (SADC Report 2017: 5). A plethora of examples from Africa 
corroborates this assertion. 
In Botswana, for example, the San, or Bushmen, were forced to 
leave their ancestral homes in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, 
“allegedly to open the park to diamond mining” (SADC Report 2017: 5). 
In Ethiopia, the government embarked on a “vigilization” policy aimed 
to forcefully displace the people of Gambella from their ancestral 
home to pave the way for corporate and industrial farming, a move 
that has resulted in gross violations of human rights (Human Rights 
Watch 2012). In Nigeria, oil exploration has turned its Ogoni area 
into a wasteland: lands, streams and creeks are totally and continually 
polluted; the atmosphere has been poisoned, charged as it is with 
hydrocarbon vapours, methane, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide 
and soot emitted by gas which has been flared 24 hours a day for 
33 years in very close proximity to human habitation. Acid rain, oil 
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spillages and oil blowouts have devastated Ogoni territory (Amnesty 
International 2005). These are only a few of the devastating effects 
on property rights violations and clean environment. 
While the mining industry can bring significant social, economic, 
political and environmental changes to the regions in which 
they operate, their practices can also lead to conflict between the 
corporation and local communities. Corporations can be involved in 
human rights abuses in many different ways; because of the adverse 
impacts they may cause or contribute to through their activities, or by 
virtue of their business relations (Zerk 2014: 16–30). Hence, ensuring 
the legal and political accountability of corporations and access to 
justice for effective financial remedy for communities affected by such 
abuses is a vital part of a State’s duty to protect against business-related 
human rights abuses (A/HRC/17/31). 
In the next sections this article shows how at present, accountability 
and access to remedy in such cases is often elusive in the African 
context. Although causing or contributing to severe human rights 
abuses would amount to a crime in many jurisdictions, corporations 
in Africa’s extractive sector are seldom the subject of law enforcement 
and criminal sanctions (Mailey 2015). Under such circumstances, one 
has to ask what value access to justice has for local communities? This 
question will be unpacked below.
Human rights violations caused by business activities give rise to 
causes of action in many jurisdictions, yet community claims often fail 
to proceed to judgment and, where a remedy is obtained, it frequently 
does not meet the international standard of “adequate, effective 
and prompt reparation for harm suffered” (UN Resolution 60/147). 
Business-related human rights abuses that impact local communities 
usually occur in the contexts discussed below. The aim here is to justify 
the value of access to justice for local communities. 
Access to Justice as a Value for Local African Communities
Displacement of communities from their land, destruction of forests, loss 
of livelihood and indigenous rights 
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Surface mining usually requires the displacement of farmers from their 
land. In Ghana, for example, cocoa is the major cash crop for small-
scale farmer communities and in order to pave way for mining, farms 
have been destroyed without the consent of the farmers. As a result, 
affected farmers have become impoverished and are unable to send 
their children to school, pay medical bills and invest in a new farm 
(Twerefou and Tutu 2015; Ayitey et al 2011). Mining activities often 
involve the destruction of forests which provide communities with 
food or fire wood. This further poses a severe threat to their right to 
food, health and education (Twerefou and Tutu 2015).
Although mining corporations can potentially provide important 
economic benefits for catchment communities, the significant amount 
of land and other livelihood resources they appropriate can also 
cause severe community dislocation and hinder local development 
(Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010: 251–272). In many rural stretches 
of West Africa, for example, communities are often guided by a strong 
sense of indigenous rights over natural resources, which may be deeply 
connected to their identity and are characterised by a firm sense of 
local entitlement, all of which can lead to a resentment of outsiders 
who exploit local resources for profit (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 
2010: 251–272). Conflict at the community level may ensue over 
“the control of space, the governance of territory, access to land and 
water resources, the defence of human and citizenship rights, and 
dissatisfaction over the distribution of mineral rents” (Bebbington 
et al. 2008: 893). 
The loss of livelihood resources associated with large-scale open-pit 
mines are particularly damaging to communities because they demand 
significant quantities of energy to operate. As Bebbington et al. 
(2008: 893) further note, mine development is often integrated with 
the construction of dams, hydroelectric plants, or other sources of 
energy, which can intensify existing competition over land, water, and 
energy. In response to perceptions of accumulation by dispossession, 
local communities may therefore mobilise around demands for 
distributive justice, “a more equitable distribution of the benefits 
deriving from the exploitation of natural resources” (Perreault 2006: 
154). This may take the form of demanding financial remedies such 
as the setting up of a fund in which royalties are deposited for the 
use of community development. For example, the Rwandese Cabinet 
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approved a mechanism to share revenue from mining so as to support 
the development of communities living near the sites (The New Times 
2016). Another example is that of Newmont Goldcorp. Newmont has 
set up a community foundation into which 1% net operational profit 
from its Ahafo South mine in Ghana plus $1 per oz of gold from Ahafo 
is deposited (World Bank 2010: 35). Communities then participate 
through the Ahafo Social Responsibility Forum (ASRF) in order to 
determine the allocation of community development funds.
Land use conflicts can become particularly intense when the issue of 
tenure becomes unclear. In some cases, different systems of tenure 
may overlap (for example, customary tenure versus state ownership); 
disputes may arise over disagreements concerning surface versus 
subsoil ownership; and conflict may be ignited when different 
claims on valuable minerals or hydrocarbons are at stake. Indeed, 
land acquisition associated with extractive industry investments can 
further obscure tenure rights, particularly when they are insecure or 
contested (Cotula 2014). In the case of Liberia, for example, a report 
for the Government Land Commission suggests that the government 
has issued concessions to commercial entrepreneurs, communities, 
and to conservation programs that exceed 50 percent of the country’s 
land area. Much of this land, the report adds, has long been utilised 
by rural populations, opening up the inevitable likelihood for land 
disputes and conflict to erupt (Wit 2012), and no amount of financial 
remedies can be quantified for depriving communities of their land. 
However, even when mining corporations agree to compensate local 
communities for land appropriated, or relocate them to different 
areas, it often cannot adequately make up for losses, particularly when 
the territory is so closely associated with social identity and a strong 
cultural or spiritual connection to the land exists (Cotula 2014).
Consequently, financial remedies are limited towards what can be 
properly assessed and quantified. Loss of land, crops and livestock 
can be estimated at market value, while loss of lives and polluting 
the environment are subject to the compensation determined by the 
courts. However, placing a financial figure on loss of social identity 
as a result of displacement and separation from ancestral land is 
a challenge not yet addressed by law nor government policy. This is 
a unique feature of African local communities whose identity is tied 
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to their land. In such circumstances financial compensation itself 
cannot suffice as a remedy for displacement. 
Environmental degradation
Environmental degradation caused by mining corporations projects 
can increase the vulnerability of the poor, exacerbate tensions, and 
trigger conflict. Such sentiments are confirmed in a study by Franks 
(et al. 2014), who examined publicly available information concerning 
50 different cases of prolonged company-community conflict around 
mining operations globally and reported that environmental issues 
were identified as the most common triggers of conflict. There is 
perhaps no clearer example of the devastation that the environmental 
impacts of the extractive industry can have on local-level livelihoods 
than the situation that has unfolded in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta. 
Watts (2004: 263) notes: “the consequences of flaring, spillage 
and waste for Ogoni fisheries and farming have been devastating. 
Two independent studies completed in 1997 reveal total petroleum 
hydrocarbons in Ogoni streams at 360 and 680 times the European 
Community permissible levels.” Such ecological damage to farming 
and fishing-related traditional livelihood structures has, according 
to Pegg and Zabbey (2013: 391–405), largely been accepted by the 
government as the legitimate consequences of doing business in 
the Niger Delta. It has also been a major factor in perpetuating oil-
related conflicts for over two decades, first in the form of community 
protests against oil industry operations; then as the main driver of the 
petro-violence associated with insurgency and the counter-insurgency 
responses by state security forces (Watts and Ibaba 2011: 1–19).
In such circumstances, one has to question again the value access 
to justice has for local communities. Access to justice becomes the 
palladium for protecting land and environment against further 
damage. It forces the State under its duty to respect, protect and fulfil 
to compel mining corporations to align their business activities 
on privately owned land with the principle of public interest. This 
dichotomy of private and public interest can only be met through 
company-community consultations. Such consultations are a means 
of access to justice for local communities. When consultation fails 
to secure and protect the rights of communities then judicial steps 
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provide the avenue for the justiciability of rights that have been 
violated.  
Insufficient community consultation and compensation
It is frequently the case that conflict within catchment communities 
can result from grievances that stem from insufficient compensation 
for loss of resources, or inadequate consultation with companies and 
governments. Although many countries have now adopted community 
development agreements or similar arrangements in their mining 
laws, companies still often deal directly with central government 
agencies, bypassing local stakeholders altogether. In cases in which 
limited community consultation does take place, mining companies 
may privilege relations with elites or traditional leaders, whose 
interests can diverge considerably from those of the community 
(Maconachie et al. 2015). 
In such situations, elites may capture supplier contracts, employment 
opportunities, and other benefits. For example, in the context of the 
major iron ore investments that have recently taken place in Sierra 
Leone, Fanthorpe and Gabelle (2013: 72) point out that “companies 
are not required to secure local landowners’ consent in order to obtain 
large-scale mining licenses; they merely have to supply licensing 
authorities with evidence that they have consulted with ‘interested 
and affected parties’.” The responsibility to consult, they continue, 
“does not grant communities a right of input into either the terms of 
mining license agreements or the monitoring of environmental and 
social management programmes” (Ibid: 73). 
Protection against the abject dismissal of community participation, as 
the affected parties stipulate the conditions in the mining contracts, 
is, therefore, achieved through access to justice. As a result of the 
foregoing challenges that adversely impact communities, these 
communities turn towards justice to secure their rights over their 
land and environment. 
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Different avenues for redress available to local 
communities 
There are various types of redress available to communities seeking 
redress for business-related human rights violations, such as 
injunctions, damages/compensation, revocation/cancellation of 
mining licenses, conservatory orders, prohibitory orders as well as 
criminal sanctions. These remedies can be sought through judicial 
mechanisms. Non-judicial mechanisms also provide some form of 
remedies. The present article, however, limits itself to addressing 
financial remedies (damages/ compensation) awarded to communities 
against multinational corporations and the extent to which access 
to financial remedies is available, adequate, effective and prompt. 
Financial remedies may be available through judicial as well as non-
judicial approaches. 
Communities seeking to use judicial mechanisms to obtain a financial 
remedy face many political and legal challenges. While those challenges 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there are persistent problems 
common to many jurisdictions. These include fragmented, poorly 
designed or incomplete legal regimes; lack of legal development; 
lack of awareness of the scope and operation of regimes; structural 
complexities within business enterprises; problems in gaining access 
to sufficient funding for community claims; and a lack of enforcement 
and political support. These problems have all contributed to a system 
of domestic law remedies that are “patchy, unpredictable, often 
ineffective and fragile” (Zerk 2014: 7).
The right to an effective remedy for harm is a core tenet of international 
human rights law and a key value of the right to have access to 
justice. The obligations of States with respect to this right have been 
reflected in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (A/
HRC/17/31) in terms of a “State’s duty to protect” against business-
related human rights abuses, of which providing access to an effective 
remedy is an integral part.
Mining corporations often explore and operate near land and property 
belonging to, or being used by, communities. Mining can negatively 
affect the local environment, including water and biodiversity, as 
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well as people’s livelihoods (which often depend on the health of the 
environment or access to land and resources). However, the existing 
literature on access to financial remedies for communities affected by 
the operations, policies and projects of corporations in the extractives 
sector is fairly limited. The Business and Society Exploring Solutions 
(BASES) website provides online access to the largest collection of 
materials on grievance mechanisms. This website aims to provide 
a collaborative workspace for sharing information and learning about 
how dispute resolution between corporations and society works 
around the world, but it provides no information on access to financial 
remedies for communities. A need to close this gap in literature thus 
arises. Consequently, the next sections respond to answering the 
question about the extent to which local communities are able to 
access financial remedies under their right to have access to justice. 
Judicial Approach 
Access to justice for financial remedies can be sought through judicial 
as well as non-judicial mechanisms, which are both social tools to 
regulate society in order to maintain order. Judicial mechanisms lie 
at the “core of ensuring access to justice” (A/HRC/17/31, Principle 
26). Ensuring judicial access to justice is complex and involves 
issues such as national judicial structures, institutional capacity, the 
community’s access to resources and funding, as well as policy and 
enforcement constraints. Having overcome any practical barriers, the 
first legal hurdle for the community is to establish that the relevant 
court has jurisdiction over the matter and the parties. This has proven 
challenging in many human rights related claims in which rights-
holders attempt to seek a remedy directly against a parent company in 
its home jurisdiction for the activities of a subsidiary occurring abroad. 
Such claims are put forward for a variety of reasons, including 
barriers to accessing effective remedies from the courts where the 
harm occurred, and the fact that a parent company may be better 
placed financially to satisfy a successful claim. Access to justice also 
requires demonstrating a recognised legal basis for the claim, and 
the possibility of adequate and appropriate forms of remedy for harm 
suffered. Claimants in such cases increasingly allege that the parent 
company has breached a duty of care owed to the rights-holder, or 
that the corporate veil should be pierced (or disregarded) to enable 
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the parent company’s liability for the activities of its subsidiaries. An 
examination of selected cases has demonstrated that legal barriers 
prevent local communities from accessing justice through the courts. 
What follows next are five cases of communities unsuccessfully 
accessing financial remedies through judicial mechanisms.
The case of Mali
With the opening of the Sadiola mines in 1996 by La Société 
d’Exploitation des Mines d’Or de Sadiola (SEMOS) for large-scale gold 
mining, there has been massive destruction of the environment and 
the livelihood resources of the community in Mali (Tamufor 2005: 
8). Women who were originally economically active in farming, gold 
washing or market gardening became unemployed because of the 
loss of their lands to the mining company. Skilled labour migrated to 
work in the mines, which in turn led to a sharp rise in the population, 
resulting in an overburdening of the already-limited social facilities. 
Cyanide and mercury are two toxic substances used to purify the 
minerals during mining. Its contamination of the groundwater had led 
in this area to cases of paralysis, blindness and numerous miscarriages 
(Tamufor 2005: 8). In two villages in the southwestern region of 
Sadiola in Mali, four out of five women miscarried. The Sadiola 
health district was originally built to cater for about 450 people. With 
increased population and spread of diseases, mainly respiratory due 
to the high level of dust circulation caused by mining activities, the 
health facilities also became incapable of catering to the needs of the 
increased population. The communities expressed dissatisfaction over 
compensation packages of the government and mining companies. 
Unfortunately, there is no data on what precisely constituted the 
compensation packages. The Chief of Farabacouta noted that the 
rice fields in Sadiola have been partly destroyed by roads and mining 
activities, hence rendering the activity unprofitable, but this was 
not taken into consideration during the payment of compensation 
(Tamufor 2005: 8). In Tabacota conflict arose between the community 
and the mining company when fourteen cows died as a result of eating 
cyanide-contaminated food. The company refused to compensate for 
the loss of the cattle, the reason being that the pipe burst leading to the 
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cyanide spill occurred long before the cattle were allegedly poisoned 
(Tamufor 2005: 8). 
The administrative authorities were unable to compel the mining 
company to compensate the community for the cattle loss (Tamufor 
2005: 8). There has been no effective framework or institution for 
dispute resolution. The communities have lost confidence in local 
authorities that have been mandated to settle disputes. Very little 
thought was given by decision-makers in Mali to address the conflicts 
that are inevitable with the introduction of any new project or scheme. 
Tension between the people and the community and the presence 
of immigrants from other neighbouring West African countries has 
made life difficult for the indigenous population. This has created 
a deep mistrust between the community, the administration and the 
mining companies. 
Further, the law suit that was filed under Société d’Exploitation 
des Mines d’Or de Sadiola S.A. versus Republic of Mali, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/5 was ruled in favour of the corporation denying the 
communities compensation. The judgement has not been published 
online for easy access (italaw 2015). 
The case of Zambia
Vedanta Mines took over the Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) of Zambia 
in 2004. KCM is an integrated operation in Zambia, comprising 
underground and open pit mines, a leaching plant and smelting and 
refining facilities On 6 November 2006, the entire Chingola district 
was faced with a water supply crisis following pollution of the Kafue 
River by a spillage of mining effluents from the KCM plant (Tamufor 
2005: 8). The two water companies that supply around 75,000 people 
in Chingola residential areas, Nkana Water and Sewage Company 
(NWSC) and Mulonga Water and Sewage Company (MWSC), were 
forced to shut down their plants when the Kafue River turned 
blue when a pipe delivering slurry from the tailings leach plant at 
KCM burst, releasing into the water effluents that raised chemical 
concentrations to 1,000% of acceptable levels of copper, 77,000% of 
manganese and 10,000% of cobalt (Tamufor 2005).
The result was that residents of Chingola Township were cut off from 
supplies of freshwater for six days. Some residents of more informal 
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settlements in the area, such as Hippo Pool Township, who do not have 
access to piped water, have always drawn their drinking water from the 
Kafue. In cases where piped water had been cut off, others were forced 
to go directly to the river (Tamufor 2005: 8). Although the Government 
attempted to provide water tankers and to discourage people from 
going to the Kafue, the study by Tamufor (2005) documents that 
as a result of water scarcity residents continued going to the Kafue 
(Tamufor 2005).
Consuming water as polluted as that in the Kafue, eating fish from 
the river, or plants watered with polluted water is likely to have wide-
ranging short- and long-term health implications. The chemicals 
spilled into the river cause lung and heart problems, respiratory 
diseases and liver and kidney damage. In the short term, a large 
number of residents are suffering from diarrhoea, eye infections and 
skin irritations. These are likely to be only the early signs of poisoning 
that will have long-term impacts. Exposure to manganese can cause 
“manganism,” a disease of the central nervous system affecting 
psychic and neurological functions. Brain damage effects in the local 
population may only show up in future generations. 
Despite being responsible for the water crisis in Zambia, Vedanta 
failed to take corrective or remedial action. It is not without reason 
that Vedanta has been termed unethical by the world’s second largest 
sovereign pension fund, operated by the Norwegian government (BBC 
News 2015). In November 2007 the company sold all its shares (worth 
around US$13 million) in Vedanta Resources Plc. After nearly two 
years of research, the fund found out that continuing to invest in the 
UK company would present “an unacceptable risk of contributing to 
grossly unethical activities” (BBC News 2015). No compensation was 
paid to the affected communities. In September 2015, a group of 1,826 
Zambian villagers filed a lawsuit (Dominic Liswaniso Lungowe & 
Others versus Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc, 
(2016) EWHC 975 (TCC)) against Vedanta in the UK court over the 
water pollution caused by its subsidiary’s copper mining operations. 
On 27 May 2016, an English High Court judge ruled that the lawsuit 
against Vedanta may proceed. In June 2016, the company said that it 
will appeal the English court’s May decision to allow the lawsuit to 
proceed, by challenging its jurisdiction (The Guardian 2016). This case 
for financial remedies is yet to be determined. In the meantime, the 
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affected communities continue to suffer health risks for which they 
have no finances to meet the rising cost of hospital bills. 
The case of Malawi
Under Malawian national laws when the government acquires land 
rights for public use, the landholder is entitled to compensation 
for losses suffered. A long-standing principle in many jurisdictions 
is that compensation should be guided by the objectives of equity 
and equivalence; many national constitutions provide that the 
compensation must be fair and adequate. In many instances, financial 
compensation seems inadequate in relation to the long-term social 
and economic costs of mining (Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace 2014).
Compensation in government compulsory land acquisition depends 
on the rights held (Government of Malawi 2013). Generally, in 
compulsory acquisition: from customary rights holders, compensation 
is not a legal requirement although most polices require that 
communities must be resettled. As a result, when such matters go to 
court, compensation is often discretionary, dependent on the investor 
or government agency negotiating with the community, and on the 
community’s legal awareness and access to knowledge; from private 
owners, compensation is given to the owner for ownership interests 
in the land along with other elements prescribed by law (Tilitonse 
2013). Factors taken into account by courts of law when calculating 
compensation are insubstantial, inadequate and unjust. There are no 
legal requirements stating conditions of payment of compensation 
and penalties for breach of conditions and informal tenure holders 
are not guaranteed compensation.
The case of Kenya
Base Titanium set up its titanium mining project along the coast in 
Kwale County and to facilitate its project the Government forcibly 
displaced communities who refused to accept compensation they 
considered inadequate (Economic Commission for Africa 2013). 
The Government did not consult the community on the question of 
compensation and merely imposed its unilateral and arbitrary decision 
on the communities (Economic Commission for Africa 2013). The 
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communities filed a law suit against the corporation, which remains 
unsettled. 
This case establishes the failure on the part of the Government that 
has the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights to enable access 
to financial remedies by communities affected by business-related 
human rights violations. In this case, access to financial remedies 
by the communities was not only denied by the Government but in 
unilaterally assessing the compensation payable the Government did 
not even consider benchmarks within which to establish what would 
have amounted to adequate compensation (Economic Commission 
for Africa 2013). 
The Mining Act of Kenya, including a clause on financial remedies, 
states that an owner or occupier of land who is dissatisfied with the 
compensation offered could refer the matter to court within one 
month of making the demand for compensation (Mining Act 2016). 
It also stipulates procedures for the payment of compensation where 
mineral rights disturb or deprive the owners or lawful occupiers or 
users of the land or part of the land. In such cases, the person seeking 
compensation is required to make a demand or claim for compensation 
to the holder of the mineral right, who should then pay “prompt, 
adequate and fair compensation” (Mining Act 2016: section 153). 
With respect to the Mining Act providing access to financial remedies, 
it requires the mineral rights holder to deposit a compensation 
guarantee bond with the Ministry and encourages parties to resolve 
disputes on compensation amicably through negotiations. Where 
negotiations fail, parties may refer the dispute to the Cabinet Secretary 
for determination and further appeal to the High Court where the 
determination so made is unsatisfactory. A challenge would be where 
such an owner or occupier is financially incapable of affording legal 
services to retain the services of a lawyer and pay for court filing fees 
thereby being unable to access justice. 
The case of Tanzania
The case of Tanzania shows the emotive relationship between 
African communities and land. A study conducted by the Society 
for International Development (2009) revealed that inadequate 
compensation awarded to communities that occupied land containing 
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minerals led to conflicts. Such conflict was exacerbated due to the 
fact that the community members were first not aware of the criteria 
applied towards awarding them compensation, and second, that the 
criteria used were itself not clear. The affected communities were not 
even involved in the process for determining compensation, which 
they then deemed unfair (Society for International Development 
2009). In terms of compensation, the communities were paid only 
for the investment or work that they put into the land but not for the 
land itself. Financial remedies were therefore restricted to what was 
added onto the land, not the value of the land itself.
Moreover, in accessing judicial avenues to seek financial remedies, 
the affected communities found the legal system to be extremely 
difficult and expensive to claim the compensation due to them and 
this resulted in these communities being awarded compensation that 
was insignificant and subject to embezzlement by the authorities 
entrusted to distribute it (Lange 2011). The Tanzanian Mining Act 
of 2010 provides for compensation to be fair and reasonable and 
stipulates that disputes on the amount of compensation are to be 
referred to the Commissioner for resolution and that further appeals 
must be directed to the High Court. In the case of Kahama Mining 
Corp. Ltd. versus Maalim Kadau & Others Civil (Case No. 12 of 1995, 
High Court of Tanzania), a mining corporation sought the eviction 
of a local community from the area of its operation without proper 
compensation. This community had been residing within the area from 
which the corporation sought their eviction since 1975 and despite 
this the court ordered their eviction without deliberating on how the 
community was to be financially compensated. 
These judicial cases demonstrate the failure by local communities 
to access justice in seeking a fair compensation against the mining 
corporation’s business-related human rights violations. The seven 
cases outlined above point to several contributing factors that have 
restricted their right to access to justice. These can be summarised as: 
(1) lack of knowledge, support and information on the legal process 
and the unavailability of legal aid to advance their cases in court; 
(2) the barriers put up within corporate law make it difficult to sue 
a subsidiary in a country where rights have been violated; (3) the 
mining company is pursuing an appeal that lasts for considerable 
lengths of time; (4) out of court settlements with community leaders 
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who are enticed by bribes; and (5) the local government siding with 
mining companies at the disadvantage of the communities. 
Non-Judicial Approach 
Other than going to court, a number of non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms are offered by States. These can range from those 
provided by national human rights institutions, labour tribunals, 
ombudsmen, and National Contact Points established pursuant 
to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, to multi-
stakeholder initiatives involving States. There are also calls for other 
mechanisms, not traditionally designed to address violation of 
rights, to be reformed in order to facilitate access to justice. This has 
arisen, for example, in the context of the independent accountability 
mechanisms of development banks, which are often State-based 
lending institutions or international organisations. These banks have 
an internal monitoring system to check whether the companies they 
are financing are operating in observance of human rights. 
In January 2016, various organisations cooperated in publishing 
a report entitled “Glass Half Full? The State of Accountability in 
Development Finance” (Franks et al. 2014). The report examines 
several mechanisms against criteria in the United Nations Guiding 
Principles and proposes adaptations aimed at rendering non-judicial 
mechanisms accessible to complainants. As part of the obligation 
to facilitate access to justice, these non-judicial mechanisms have 
entertained the possibility of creating remedy funds that will 
compensate local communities directly for the failures of development 
institutions to properly oversee the impact of finance provided to 
corporations. Whether these non-judicial mechanisms have proved 
more effective than judicial measures is a question this section 
examines. 
Defining non-judicial mechanisms 
Ruggie (2011: 28) defines non-judicial mechanisms as “any routinized, 
State-based or non-State-based, judicial or non-judicial process 
through which grievances concerning business related human rights 
abuse can be raised and remedy can be sought.” If his definition is to be 
further analysed, three key points must be noted: (1) State involvement 
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in non-judicial mechanisms is not a condition; (2) human rights 
violations can be addressed through the non-judicial approach; and 
(3) the power to grant remedies is also bestowed through the non-
judicial approach. According to Ruggie (2011) the only condition is 
that such non-judicial processes have to be considered as a routine. 
That is, the mechanism must be available, consistent and be seen as 
working. It must be an established procedure. 
Hill (2010) provided another definition which, if looked together with 
Ruggie’s, gives clarity on what a routinised non-judicial process means. 
According to Hill (2010: 7), a routinised non-judicial process would 
mean “a company-supported, locally based and formalised method, 
pathway or process to prevent and resolve community concerns with, 
or grievances about, the performance or behavior of a company, its 
contractors or employees.” Hill’s definition is informative on two 
points that help us understand what a routinised non-judicial process 
means. First, it concerns the formalities and second, it relates to 
process. The test of routine, therefore, lies in the analysis of these two 
points. The first point concerning formalities requires that the non-
judicial process must meet three criteria: (1) it must be supported by 
the company; (2) it must be locally based; and (3) it must be a formal 
process. The second point on process considers the substance of the 
complaint and the remedies being sought and this entails ideas of 
how to prevent and resolve community grievances. Hill’s definition, 
however, does not expressly associate dispute resolution under the 
non-judicial process with remedies. Only Ruggie’s definition allows 
for remedies to be seen as part of the non-judicial process. Hill’s 
definition also does not provide guidance on how to interpret what 
is meant by a formalised method.
Previous direction on the meaning of a formalised method for non-
judicial processes was provided by the International Council on Mining 
and Metals (ICMM 2009). The ICMM explained that a formalised 
method meant a “set of processes a company may have in place to 
deal with local level concerns and grievances.” This definition is 
problematic in that it leaves to the discretion of a company whether 
or not to have a non-judicial mechanism to resolve community 
grievances. It limits the non-judicial process to the arbitrary decision-
making power of a company in either setting up the formal process 
or disregarding it. This in itself breaches the right to access to justice 
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since it fails to express clearly how the non-judicial process relates to 
a formalised method. 
Following from the ICMM definition, that pushed the non-judicial 
process as a discretionary tool with companies, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC 2009) has provided benchmarks with which 
to assess the non-judicial process as a formalised method. These 
benchmarks help to strengthen the non-judicial process as an avenue 
through which the right to gain access to justice can be made available 
to local communities. The IFC (2009: 4) definition simply provides 
that the non-judicial approach is “a process for receiving, evaluating, 
and addressing project-level grievances from affected communities 
at the level of the company, or project.” The benchmarks to be noted 
out of this definition equate the non-judicial approach as a formalised 
method: (1) a company must put in place a system for receiving local 
community complaints; (2) there must be an established system for 
evaluating those complaints; and (3) there must be a process through 
which the received and evaluated complaints are addressed by the 
company. 
These four definitions by Ruggie, Hill, ICMM and the IFC will guide the 
subsequent analysis on whether the non-judicial process has provided 
for the right to have access to justice by local communities harmed 
by business-related human rights violations in the mining sector. 
It is important to point out that there is no literature that provides 
evidence-based descriptions and analysis of the historical evolution 
of access to justice through the non-judicial process for financial 
remedies for communities affected by the operations, policies and 
projects of corporations in the extractives sector. What is available 
is literature on theory, concepts and norms related to understanding 
the impact of business-related activities on the human rights of local 
communities but not their right to access justice through financial 
remedies (see generally: Facing Finance 2018, Ruggie 2011, Hill 2010, 
Zorilla 2009). Thus, it is not possible to establish a chronological 
description of the evolution of such non-judicial remedies or attribute 
the emergence of non-judicial remedies to a particular driver or point 
in time. However, a number of factors – prior to the formulation of the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights –are likely to 
have played a role in driving the growing use of non-judicial remedies. 
These factors are discussed below in order to evaluate whether they, 
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as part of the non-judicial process, satisfy the realisation of the right 
to gain access to justice by the affected local communities.
The advent of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
A series of high-profile cases during the 1980s and 1990s involving 
major companies such as BP, Union Carbide and Shell (Sheoin and 
Pearce 2014; Vidal 2010; Pearce 2004) brought to the public eye the 
risks of large-scale industrial projects in developing countries. On 
the one hand they revealed how major transnational companies can 
have a positive impact on development by investing in poor countries, 
transferring important technologies over borders and offering 
employment opportunities. On the other, many companies had 
become powerful transnational actors, some with even larger revenues 
than the governments of the countries they were operating in. Such 
companies had the potential to have significant adverse impacts on 
communities and the environment, such as colluding with government 
security forces in extra judicial killings, providing revenues that kept 
kleptocratic governments in power, human rights violations and 
environmental degradation (Wilson and Blackmore 2013). 
These adverse impacts led communities and corporations to 
champion for corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives 
internally and develop the business case for closer attention to be 
paid to preventing and managing adverse impacts on communities. 
In relation to communities, key CSR concerns include how to ensure 
that a company’s operations do not adversely impact the surrounding 
community; that community members are appropriately consulted 
and duly compensated for any unavoidable negative impacts, and 
that the overall net impact on the community is positive (Wilson 
and Blackmore 2013). CSR reinforces the duty to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights. It is seen as a non-judicial approach to prevent 
and remedy any violation of human rights of local communities that 
could potentially arise as a result of the company’s business activities. 
In some countries the CSR principle has led to cooperation between 
companies and communities and affected communities have had their 
grievances effectively addressed. However, CSR is not an obligation 
under law and companies that do not provide for CSR measures 
cannot be held accountable by law to remedy wrongs done to local 
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communities as part of their social responsibility. The Africa Mining 
Vision (Bulletin 6) has noted that mining companies do not treat 
CSR as peripheral to their core business and only promote it in their 
business plans as a precondition for obtaining a mining license or to 
secure financing. The definition provided by Hill supports this view 
adopted by the Africa Mining Vision which shows the discretionary 
nature of CSR as a non-judicial process to resolve business-related 
human rights violations of local communities. 
The setting up of complaints mechanisms 
International Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have called 
upon international development banks that provide finance for large 
infrastructure and extractive projects in developing countries to play 
their part in ensuring effective dispute prevention and resolution for 
the communities located near the corporation’s operations. This led 
to the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel, which was the 
first complaints mechanism established by an international financial 
institution to address allegations of harm to communities from 
projects it financed (Clark 1999). Established in 1993, the mechanism 
focuses only on investigating whether the staff of the World Bank 
have complied with the Bank’s own policies or procedures — though 
in its most recent evolution it has concluded that strong company–
community relations and conflict resolution capacity should be built 
into World Bank projects from their inception.
The International Finance Corporation also established a complaints 
mechanism: the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO). Unlike the 
World Bank Inspection Panel, the CAO provided not only for compliance 
assessments but also for “problem solving,” that is, dialogue-based 
approaches to addressing complaints from communities. The 2007 
revision of its procedures introduced a clearer separation between the 
problem-solving role and the compliance-assessment role (IFC 2007).
Various regional development or investment banks, such as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), have followed suit in 
adopting complaints mechanisms. Other international and national 
mechanisms related to grievances by communities have since also 
been established to mediate disputes and/or increase corporate 
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accountability. Examples include the National Contact Points of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2000) and the 
Canadian Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor 
(FAITC 2013), which both have a mandate to mediate disputes between 
companies and communities. 
All these initiatives have created a fertile ground for companies to 
develop their own self-managed mechanisms to handle complaints 
by communities more directly, thereby giving practical effect to the 
definitions of non-judicial process given by Ruggie (2011) and IFC 
(2007). Both the IFC and CAO, among others, have required and/or 
encouraged companies to develop such mechanisms before or during 
the project, including through offering publicly available guidance 
materials. In the case of Ghana, the setting up of a complaints 
mechanism has led to a number of civil society organisations such as 
WACAM, Third World Network, and CEPIL to work together with local 
communities in successfully holding mining companies accountable 
and paying effective and fair financial remedies for breached rights 
(Kwakyewah and Idemudia 2017). 
In addition, Rees and Vermijs (2008) have identified six different types 
of mechanisms to address the setting up of community grievances. 
Whether or not these have had an impact on access to justice by local 
communities remains to be tested. Below I will investigate these six 
types and their impact on the right to have access to justice. 
The first of these types of mechanisms is information facilitation, 
which consists of gathering and disseminating information on 
grievances, leaving any further action on that information to its 
end-users. The second is negotiation, consisting of “direct dialogue 
between the parties to the grievance with the aim of resolving the 
grievance or dispute through mutual agreement” (Rees and Vermijs 
2008: 3). A third is mediation/conciliation, which is similar to 
negotiation, except that it requires the assistance of an external, 
neutral facilitator that helps solve the grievance through mutual 
agreement. This facilitator could take a more or less active and 
intrusive role in the process. The fourth is arbitration, defined as 
the “process by which neutral arbitrators selected by the parties to 
a dispute hear the positions of the parties, conduct some form of 
questioning or wider investigation and arrive at a judgment of the 
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course of action to be taken in settling the grievance or dispute, 
often [but not necessarily], with binding effect on the parties” (Rees 
and Vermijs 2008: 6). The fifth type of mechanism is investigation, 
consisting of a process aimed at gathering information and views 
about the grievance in order to produce an assessment of the facts. And 
finally, the last is adjudication, which is the formation of a judgment 
on the rights and wrongs of the parties in a disputed situation, and 
on the solution needed. The decision drawn from this procedure may 
be binding to the parties or can lead to a sanction. According to Rees 
and Vermijs (2008), adjudication differs from arbitration in that the 
parties are not required to agree on who will adjudicate and does not 
have a formal process of hearings (Rees and Vermijs 2008).
This article argues that the IFC definition mentioned under the 
paragraph defining non-judicial mechanisms by Ruggie (2011: 28) 
embodies well the Rees and Vermijs six-type scheme, in that it sets 
out a coordinated formalised method for carrying out the non-judicial 
process. Accordingly, companies have developed different internal 
mechanisms to deal with community issues on their own in line with 
the Rees and Vermijs approach. The following is a discussion of four 
African countries that show the extent to which local communities 
have been able to access non-judicial remedies over their violated 
human rights. Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Chad and Cameroon have been 
relied upon due to the availability of data. 
Nigeria 
In Nigeria, Chevron introduced the Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU 2005). This is an initiative that clusters 
together the communities on which Chevron’s operations have an 
impact and deals with their issues in a contract between company 
and community. However, no compensation has yet been paid to 
communities adversely affected by the company’s human rights abuses 
under the GMoU. This company has been sued for 1 billion Naira by the 
Chairman of Okoyitoru Development Council in the Warri South West 
local government area of the Delta State in Nigeria over environmental 
degradation caused by its operations in the community. This case was 
lodged in court in April 2017 (Nwafor 2017). The GMoU is indicative 
of types one, two, three and six of the Rees and Vermijs approach to 
non-judicial mechanisms.
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Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe, the Anglo-American company, one of the world’s 
largest mining companies, with operations in Africa categorises some 
grievances as localised “housekeeping” issues, which local staff are 
best placed to manage. These can include complaints associated with 
dust from trucks, daily blasts and noise pollution and a need to change 
the timing of operations to be less disruptive for local communities. 
More serious grievances might relate to land rights, fisheries damage 
and labour issues. One of the objectives of Anglo American’s grievance 
mechanism is to solve problems to everybody’s satisfaction before they 
get escalated into a court of law (Wilson and Blackmore 2013). This 
fits within type one, two and three of the Rees and Vermijs approach 
to non-judicial mechanisms.
Chad and Cameroon 
In Chad and Cameroon, ExxonMobil faced the challenge of having to 
acquire land in a large area where private property is not recognised by 
the state and a complex land use system that led to multiple individuals 
having claims on the same piece of land. In order to avoid potential 
conflicts with the community, ExxonMobil established a multi-
party commission that included government officials, village chiefs, 
traditional authorities, ExxonMobil representatives, and two NGOs 
selected through a competitive bidding process. The Commission 
undertook a systematic, village-by-village process of “social closure,” 
(Blanchet n.d.) whereby they reviewed each compensation agreement 
along the pipeline route, and determined whether it was in compliance 
with the broader environmental and social management plan. For 
cases of non-compliance, the commission determined appropriate 
corrective measures. To promote transparency, final compensation 
payments took place at public hearings in the affected villages, with 
one of the NGOs serving the role of “witness” to the process (Blanchet 
n.d.). The steps employed in resolving the Chad and Cameroon 
grievances are indicative of types one, two, three, five and six of the 
Rees and Vermijs approach to non-judicial mechanisms. The affected 
local communities in Chad and Cameroon were able to effectively 
access justice and receive financial compensation through the non-
judicial approach established by ExxonMobil.
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Creating room for stakeholder engagements
The evolution of stakeholder engagement is also an important driver in 
growing attention being paid to the discourse on access to non-judicial 
remedies by communities. National governments, international 
finance institutions and other investors increasingly require or expect 
that corporations identify, consult and engage with communities to 
prevent and mitigate negative social, environmental and economic 
impact to the greatest extent possible, as well as how investments in 
the community can be most beneficial (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009). 
In the last decade many organisations have sprung up to assist 
companies in this process — both for commercial and non-profit 
purposes. Leading international institutions have developed public 
guidance material on stakeholder engagement in emerging markets 
and conflict-affected areas, including the AA1000 Stakeholder 
Engagement Standard developed by AccountAbility (2011) and 
good practice guidance documents developed by IFC (2007) and 
International Alert (2005). This approach seeks to reinforce the 
understanding of non-judicial mechanisms as a formalised method 
towards preventing and remedying human rights violations of local 
communities by mining companies. A report by the International 
Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (2013) titled “Tax Abuses, 
Poverty and Human Rights” has extensively documented the failed 
approach of stakeholder engagements as a non-judicial approach to 
resolving the violation of a local community’s human rights.
This section has shown that access to financial remedies for 
communities either through the available judicial or non-judicial 
channels is neither effective nor prompt. In fact, compensatory 
relief for communities is dependent on the extent to which mining 
corporations are willing to pay for their business-related human 
rights abuses. The existing grievance mechanisms established by these 
corporations in as much as they call for stakeholder participation in 
assessing compensation for harm and damage done as a result of their 
projects is greatly aligned to the corporations policy on how much to 
compensate, which policy is politically backed by the government. 
The laws only provide for the normative framework; specifying that 
compensation must be adequate and effective, without belabouring 
to set out how to assess adequate and effective compensation. The 
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fact that access to financial remedies is unregulated leaves room for 
corporations to engage in improper practices to ensure that minimum 
compensatory relief is awarded by the corporations’ dispute resolution 
mechanism. This negatively impacts ensuring the sustainable 
development of the local communities in the long run. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The present study demonstrates that access to justice for business-
related human rights violations within the mining sector provides 
a broad spectrum for local communities to have their grievances 
addressed but often remain ineffective. The judicial approach is costly, 
time consuming and often subject to technicalities not understood 
by local communities. Therefore, non-judicial approaches to solve 
community grievances are an alternative for engaging directly with 
mining companies in order to repair damage done to communities, 
but more work needs to be done to ensure that local communities are 
not exploited by hegemonic power relations. In addition, non-judicial 
approaches may not be binding and can result in restricting the extent 
to which local communities may demand reparation following the 
violation of their human rights by the mining companies. Therefore, 
based on the foregoing discussions, this article concludes that non-
judicial approaches have more potential to secure the right to gain 
access to justice than the judicial process. However, a set of principles 
needs to be developed to facilitate this. 
Accordingly, the following seven principles can be recommended: 
(1) the principle of legitimacy that enables trust from the local 
communities for whose use the non-judicial approaches are intended 
and ensures accountability for the fair conduct of grievance processes; 
(2) the principle of accessibility, being known to all affected local 
communities for whose use the non-judicial approaches are intended, 
providing adequate assistance to those who may face particular 
barriers to access justice; (3) the principle of predictability providing 
a clear and known procedure with an indicative time frame for each 
stage, and clarity on the types of process and outcome available as 
well as means of monitoring implementation; (4) the principle of 
equitability seeking to ensure that affected local communities have 
reasonable access to sources of information, advice and expertise 
necessary to engage in a grievance process on fair, informed and 
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respectful terms; (5) the principle of transparency keeping the local 
communities to a grievance informed about its progress and providing 
sufficient information about the mechanism’s performance to build 
confidence in its effectiveness and meet any public interest at stake; 
(6) the principle of rights compatibility ensuring that outcomes and 
remedies accord with internationally recognised human rights; and (7) 
the principle of dialogue consulting the local communities for whose 
use the non-judicial approaches are intended about their design and 
performance and focusing on dialogue as the means to address and 
resolve grievances.
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